

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) SSCI Hearing on CBW

FROM:

Chairman
HUMINT Committee

EXTENSION

NO.

HC-84-393

DATE

24 Sept 84

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. EO

27 Sep

mb
Jea

rec'd
20 Sep

2. DD/ICS

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24 SEP 1984

NOTE TO: Director, ICS *BV*

THROUGH: DD/ICS

FROM: Chairman, HC

SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing on CBW

The IC briefings to the SSCI on 18 September have had a salient impact.

The attached memorandum highlights increasing Congressional interest and concern on the implications of CBW proliferation, potential terrorist use, and the Soviet novel agent development program.

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Att: as stated

INFORMATION

SECRET [REDACTED]

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
HUMINT CommitteeHC 84-393
21 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, HUMINT Committee

THROUGH: Vice Chairman, HC
C/CCS

SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing on CBW

1. Background: Intelligence Community briefings were given to various SSCI members and Senate minority and majority staffers during a Hearing on 18 September 1984. The SSCI Hearing was chaired by Senator Barry Goldwater (R/Arizona) and attended by Senator Cohen (R/Maine) and by Senator Luger (R/Indiana), as well as approximately 20 staffers. David Low, NIO at Large, and [REDACTED] DDI/OSWR, served as the principal IC representatives. (S/NF)

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2. Discussion:

a. After a general overview of the CBW threat by David Low and [REDACTED] the following three major topics were briefed in detail by various Community representatives.

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TOPICSBRIEFERS

- o Yellow Rain - Afghanistan & SEA
- o CBW Use and Proliferation:
The Iran-Iraq War
- o Novel Agents: The CBW
Genetic Engineering Threat

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b. The well organized IC briefings were most effective and elicited many questions from the Senators and staffers who appeared highly impressed by the responsiveness of the briefers. The Hearing highlighted Congressional interest and concern over the increasing prospects of CBW proliferation,

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DECL: OADR

SECRET [REDACTED]

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its potential for terrorist use, and the significant implications of the Soviet novel agent CBW RDT&E program. Several of the briefers underscored the important role of HUMINT collection, particularly clandestine. [REDACTED]

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c. CBW use during the Iran-Iraq war and Soviet novel agent developments stimulated most of the SSCI interest and questions. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Senator Goldwater stressed his own great surprise and concern over the significant and wide-ranging implications of the Soviet novel agent development program, particularly the difficulties in identification and detection, ability to penetrate US and allied protective gear, immunization, and the challenge for arms control verification and monitoring. Senator Goldwater asked whether these high priority briefings were given to the JCS and the NSC and stressed the need for "greater public awareness" of the CBW threat to enhance deterrence. [REDACTED]

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d. Of significance to the Intelligence Community, at the conclusion of the Hearings, Charles (Chip) Andrea, SSCI staffer who serves as the Chairman of an ad hoc SSCI subcommittee, informed David Low, [REDACTED] that selected Community principals would most likely be asked to report on resource needs and follow up actions to target collection and analysis against the CBW issues discussed at the Hearings. Particular attention will be focused on the Clandestine Service role. [REDACTED]

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3. Conclusion: The IC CBW briefings clearly had a salient impact on the SSCI members and staffers. Senator Goldwater indicated his appreciation for the high quality of the briefings and stated that a more detailed list of questions would be forwarded to the Community for further follow up and review.

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[REDACTED]

HUMINT Committee

SECRET [REDACTED]

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27 Sep 84

The Washington Times

U.S. may lag in bio-chemical defense plan

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The international increase in chemical and biological weapons has outstripped both the ability of U.S. intelligence to monitor the growth and arms control accords to control it.

Those conclusions — or warnings — came from a recent classified briefing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by government specialists in intelligence, defense and arms control.

The committee felt that while Congress has been preoccupied with U.S. foreign policy in Central America, a new menace has come from the surge of research in genetic engineering and chemical warfare and the apparent willingness of some large and small nations to use weapons resulting from this research.

The official said the senators were particularly troubled that a war could start, not with the much-discussed nuclear "first strike," but with a chemical-biological (CB) "first strike" against the U.S. or its European allies.

The possible use of CB weapons by terrorists for political strikes further complicates the issue.

Most defense planning is based on the assumption of a major conventional or nuclear weapons attack, and appropri-

ate response plans are in place. Relatively little has been done to anticipate, defend against or mitigate the effects of chemical-biological attacks, he said.

One reason for lack of chemical and biological defense planning is that the fields are relatively recent. Genetic engineering is an example. Experiments are being done by governments, as well as private interests, that have the potential for creating biological weapons that simply are not addressed in current arms control accords or in defense plans.

The use of mycotoxins or "yellow rain" in Southeast Asia and probably in Afghanistan are examples, according to an administration official. He said U.S. experts at first were at a loss to detect the mycotoxin which was finally discovered to be a poison produced from a fungus.

The Soviets have other CB weapons that are more effective for depopulating an area, he said, but the "yellow rain" is useful for terrorizing a population because the death it causes is hideous (vomiting blood) and the preceding yellow cloud therefore spreads terror on the battlefield.

The Senate official added that there is no evidence that a capability to

deliver a large-scale chemical-biological strike now exists in any of the major world powers. What is possible is that political and military leaders in Washington, D.C., for instance, could be "softened up" prior to a strike by introducing a debilitating virus into the metropolitan area.

Defense experts are aware of Soviet doctrine that calls for CB use as part of a conventional attack through the NATO nations. Soviet forces train for such warfare much more thoroughly than U.S. or other NATO powers do, and their equipment is better prepared to "button up" for fighting in a CB environment.

"It's just too difficult for arms controllers to anticipate all these technologies," the Senate official said.

"This is a serious thing that we should be talking to the Soviets about," he added.

In the 1970s the CIA and arms controllers, as part of the U.S.-Soviet policy of détente then in effect, paid relatively little attention to CB weapons because there appeared to be not much work going on in the field and the weapons that did exist were not being used.

President Richard Nixon stopped U.S. chemical weapon production lines in 1969, though the stockpiles were maintained.

Also, the 1972 biological weapons convention, signed by the United States, Soviets and others called for the destruction of all biological weapons stocks and no production of more. A Reagan administration official called it "a classic détente document. There were no verification provisions."

However, since that era of little activity in CB, things have changed. Along with research in bioengineering and other areas, CB weapons have been used in the Iran-Iraq war, and many government officials believe that the Soviets have experimented with them in Afghanistan, at least initially, since their 1979 invasion of that country.

In Southeast Asia, where the use of "yellow rain" has been better verified, administration sources say that North Vietnam is thought to have secured mycotoxins — and training for their use — from the Soviets.

While there is no new, startling information in the briefing by "the community," as the Senate official called the CIA, defense and other specialists, the information in its worldwide context implies that the United States is in danger of being overtaken by events.

— Thomas D. Brandt

Proxmire hits State Dept. travel

WASHINGTON (AP) — The State Department spent more than \$400,000 in two years on ocean travel, mostly first class, for embassy employees who could have flown for a fraction of the cost, Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., said yesterday.

"When it comes to using ocean liner travel when air travel would be cheaper, the State Department regulations have about as much backbone as a jellyfish," Sen. Proxmire said. "Sometimes ocean travel is paid with U.S. dollars. In

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